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Abstract
Wireless communication is different than wired communication. These differences affect how a secure channel
can be established in a wireless environment.  The purpose of this tutorial is to provide an overview of how a
secure channel can be set up in a wireless environment.
Keywords:  WLAN Security, WTLS, WAP, WEP, 802.11b
Introduction
Wireless and mobile networks are rapidly extending their capabilities.  In addition to their increasing bandwidth and the because
of their flexibility and freedom they are becoming the communication infrastructure of choice.  Wireless communication provides
a user the capability of conducting  commerce at anytime, with nearly anyone,  from anywhere, using a mobile communication
channel.  This mobile communication channel can be used as an access method the Internet.  
As wireless communication and the Internet become truly interoperable a user will desire that this communication channel is
secure and available when needed.   For a message sent using this communication channel, the user expects assurance of: 
 authentication  (the sender and receiver are who they say they are); 
 confidentiality (the message cannot be understood except by the receiver); and 
 integrity  (the message has not been altered).
The goal of this tutorial is to provide an overview of what is required to provide a secure communication channel in a wireless
environment.   The focus will be the security techniques available for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) and when wireless
devices are used to access the Internet.
The tutorial is organized as follows. Section 1 summarizes WLAN security specified in the 802.11 standard.   Section 2
summarizes the security problems and solutions when small, low-powered devices try to use low-bandwidth wireless network
technology to access services or data-intensive content via the Internet.  In particular Section 2 summarizes the WAP protocol
and its security features.
WLAN Security Requirements
This section discusses the access control methods and channel security of the 802.11 architecture.  These techniques are best
suited for home users, small networks, or networks with low security requirements. In addition, this sections presents a VPN
(Virtual Private Network)-based security solution which provides better security and is suitable for large networks.
With the deployment of wireless networks in business environments, organizations are working to implement security mechanisms
that are equivalent to those of wire-based LANs. An additional component of this security requirement is the need to restrict
access to the wireless network to valid users.  Physical access to the WLAN is different than access to a wired LAN.  Existing
wired network have access points, typically RJ45 connectors, located inside buildings which may be secured from unauthorized
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access through the use of such devices as keys and  badge access. A user must gain physical access to the building in order to plug
a client computer into a network jack. 
A wireless access point (AP) may be accessed from off the premises if the signal is detectable.  Hence wireless networks require
secure access to the AP in a manner different from wired LANs.  In particular it is necessary to isolate the AP from the internal
network until authentication is verified.  The device attempting to connect to the AP must be authenticated. Once the device is
authenticated then the user of the device can be authenticated.  At this point the user may desire a secure channel for
communication.
The 802.11 standard provides the means to satisfy these two security requirements - validation of the access device and a secure
channel
.
Basic 802.11 Security 
The three basic methods to secure access to an AP that are built into 802.11 networks are: 
  Service Set Identifier (SSID)
  Media Access Control (MAC) address filtering
  Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
One or all of these methods may be implemented, but all three together provide the best solution.
SSID 
Control of network access can be gained by using an SSID associated with an AP or group of APs. The SSID is a mechanism to
that can segment a wireless network into multiple networks serviced by one or more APs. Each AP is programmed with an SSID
that corresponds to a specific wireless network. This configuration is similar to the concept of a network address used in wired
LANs.  To be able to access a particular wireless network the client computer must be configured with the appropriate SSID. A
WLAN might be segmented into multiple WLAN based floor or department.  A client computer can be configured with multiple
SSIDs for users who require access to the network from a variety of different locations.
A client computer must present the correct SSID to access the AP. The SSID acts as a password and provides a measure of
security.  This minimal security can be compromised if the AP is configured to broadcast its SSID. If this broadcast feature is
enabled any client computer that is not configured with an SSID will receive the SSID and then be able to access the AP. Most
often, users configure their own client systems with the appropriate SSIDs.  As a result these SSIDs are widely known and easily
shared. 
SSID provides a method to control access to an AP or set of APs .  An additional technique that enhances this method is MAC
(Media Access Control) Address Filtering.
MAC Address Filtering 
A client computer can be identified by the unique MAC address of its 802.11 network card. To enhance AP access control each
AP can be programmed with a list of MAC addresses associated with the client computers allowed to access the AP. If a client's
MAC address is not included in this list and the SSID provided by the client does not match the AP's SSID the client is not
allowed to access the AP. 
This arrangement provides improved security that is best suited to small networks where the MAC address list can be managed
efficiently. The management requires that each AP must be programmed manually with a list of MAC addresses. In addition this
list must be kept up-to-date.  Clearly this overhead will limit the size of the WLAN in number of APs and clients devices.
SSID and MAC Address Filtering satisfy the first of the two requirements of WLAN Security.  The second requirement - channel
security - is provided by WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy)
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WEP Security
Wireless transmissions are easier to intercept than transmissions in wired networks. In most cases users of WLANs desire secure
transmissions.  The 802.11 standard specifies the WEP security protocol to provide encrypted communication between the client
and an AP. WEP employs the RC4 symmetric key encryption algorithm.
When using WEP, all clients and APs on a wireless network use the same key to encrypt and decrypt data. The key resides in the
client computer and in each AP on the network. Since the 802.11 standard does not specify a key management protocol.  Hence
all WEP symmetric keys on a network will be managed manually. Support for WEP is standard on most current 802.11 cards and
APs. However WEP security is not available in ad hoc (or peer-to-peer) 802.11 networks that do not use APs. 
WEP specifies the use of a 40-bit encryption key and there are also implementations of 104-bit keys. The encryption key is
concatenated with a 24-bit initialization vector, resulting in a 64- or 128-bit key. This key is input into a pseudorandom number
generator. The resulting sequence is used to encrypt the data to be transmitted.  The shared key can be used for client
authentication as well by a four step process between the AP and the client.  This process is as follows:
1.  the client make an authentication  request to the AP; 
2.  the AP returns a challenge phrase to the client;
3. the client encrypts the challenge phrase using the shared symmetric key and transmits it to the AP;
4.  the AP then compares the client's response with its phrase; if there is a match, the client is authorized otherwise the
client is rejected.
WEP encryption is vulnerable to attack (See http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html). As a result, scripting tools
exist that can be used to take advantage of weaknesses in the WEP key algorithm to successfully attack a network and discover
the WEP key (see http://sourceforge.net/projects/wepcrack ). Currently the industry and IEEE are working on solutions to this
problem.  The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) has been identified as a possible replacement encryption technology for
WEP.  In addition,  revised 802.11 standards (802.11i.and 802.1x) may be adopted which address the security weaknesses of the
current standard (Kapp 2002) .
Despite the weaknesses of WEP-based security it can be a component of the security solution used in home networks and in small
but managed networks with low security requirements. Nonetheless with these networks, 128-bit WEP should be implemented
in conjunction with MAC address filtering and SSID. In addition some sort of WEP symmetric key management should be
employed.  For example users should change their WEP keys on a regular schedule to minimize risk of compromise. 
If a network has high security requirements, or will allow many clients, an alternative to the SSID/MAC Address Filtering/WEP
protocol is a VPN (Virtual Private Network) solution.  VPNs are a mature technology that allow a client to use an "untrusted"
network (e.g. the Internet or a wireless network) for secure communication.  Briefly this solution requires both:
 a VPN server installed on the network being access by the wireless client and 
 the wireless client having the VPN client software installed .
WAP Protocol 1.x
WAP was designed to solve some of the problems caused when small, low-powered devices try to use low-bandwidth wireless
network technology to access services or data-intensive content via the Internet.  In particular, users want to be able to access e-
mail, trade stocks, find out the latest sports scores, or the most recent news event via a cell phone in a secure fashion.
The WAP protocol stack is made up of  five layers. These are:
 Application
 Session
 Transaction
 Security
 Transport
The functional requirements of each layer are specified below.
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Wireless Application Environment (WAE)
The WAE layer provides an environment to develop and execute applications. In addition it provides services for wireless devices.
The WAE layer's primary elements are WML (Wireless Markup Language), a microbrowser, Push technology to push data
proactively to clients, and multimedia messaging capability. 
Wireless Session Protocol (WSP)
WSP manages the exchange of content.  WSP provides applications with a consistent interface for both connection-oriented and
connectionless session services. WSP lets client and server applications establish and terminate reliable sessions and agree on
common protocols with which to work. WSP also includes extensions that facilitate wireless transmissions. For example, WSP's
compact binary headers reduce the overhead and number of transactions necessary to support session services.
Wireless Transaction Protocol (WTP)
WTP manages transactions by facilitating requests and responses between a user agent (such as a WAP microbrowser) and an
application server for such activities as browsing and e-commerce transactions.  WTP works well in the low-bandwidth wireless
environment because it requires the wireless device and the gateway to send each other relatively few packets to manage or
maintain the connection.  WTP can provide data streaming, hypermedia, and message transfer.
Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS)
WTLS secures, authenticates, and encrypts data transmissions between the WAP gateway and mobile devices. To support mobile
networks, WTLS was designed to be more efficient than SSL, which requires client and server to exchange many messages. In
wireless networks, which frequently experience considerable latency, this requirement can slow response time significantly.  WAP
systems translate WTLS data to SSL data for transmission over the Internet within the WAP gateway.
Wireless Datagram Protocol (WDP) 
WDP lets WAP support many network technologies.   WAP works with the major wireless network technologies used in different
parts of the world, including CDMA (code-division multiple access), GSM (global system for mobile communication), and
TDMA (time-division multiple access). WAP also supports the major operating systems used in handheld devices (e.g. JavaOS,
PalmOS, and Windows CE).  When working with IP bearer services, WDP functions just like the User Datagram Protocol. With
non-IP bearer services, such as CDMA, WDP performs the adaptation necessary to carry transmissions.
WAP and Internet Access
WAP uses proxy technology to connect wireless technology with the Web. The WAP proxy server consists of a gateway,
encoders, and decoders. The gateway translates requests from the WAP protocol stack to the WWW stack so they can be
submitted to Web servers.  Encoders and decoders translate WAP content into compact encoded formats that reduce the amount
of data being sent over the low-bandwidth wireless network.  Wireless technology's bandwidth and latency constraints cannot
support the Internet standards of HTML, HTTP, IP, TCP, and TLS (transport layer security). These are inefficient over mobile
networks.  For example, HTTP sends its headers in text format, instead of compressed binary format. Meanwhile, to work with
HTTP and HTML, machines must have fast network connections, powerful processors, and large memories, components not
currently found in handheld devices.
WAP 1.x Security
The layer of the WAP protocol that provides security is the WTLS layer.  WTLS functions similar to SSL (also known as
Transport Layer Security (TLS)).  WTLS provides for server and/or client authentication via certificates similar to X.509
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certificates.  WTLS also allows for the negotiation of encryption parameters between the client and server, thus ensuring a secure
channel for communication. Although WTLS does not provide end-to-end security, the chances of a problem are small because
hackers can breach security only when sensitive data passes through the WAP gateway.  WTLS provides the security necessary
to conduct e-commerce on handheld wireless devices.
WAP Protocol 2.0
In January, 2002 the WAP Forum released version 2.0 of the Wireless Application Protocol -
http://www.wapforum.org/what/WAPWhite_Paper1.pdf. 
WAP 2.0 extends bearer services to include GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) and 3G (3rd Generation) cellar thus providing
access to higher bandwidth and speeds.  Because of providing these extend services WAP 2.0 contains support for the standard
Internet protocols of IP, TCP and HTTP.
To interoperate with these Internet Protocols, the  WAP 2.0 Protocol stack contains:
1. WP-HTTP (Wireless Profiled HTTP) - A profile of HTTP for wireless environment that is interoperable with HTTP/1.1;
2. TLS (Transport Layer Security) - a profile of the TLS protocol that will allow for secure transactions. And provide for end-to-
end security at the transport layer.  This is similar to what wire users expect with the SSL layer; and
3. WP-TCP (Wireless Profiled TCP) WP-TCP will provide connection-oriented services.
The WAP 2.0 enabled device now contains the following layers:
 WAE Layer
 WP-HTTP
 TLS
 P-TCP
 IP
 Wireless
As a result, a WAP 2.0-enabled device will be able to interact efficiently with a wired web server  through a WAP Proxy which
only contains only the wireless to wired, IP to IP, TCP to TCP layers.
Finally, to remain backward compatible with existing WAP 1.x applications, newer WAP devices will support both stacks  (WAP
1.x and WAP 2.x) independently.  As a result the WAE layer will be accessible to both stacks.
WAP 2.0 Security
Since WAP 2.0 includes a version of TLS (Transport Layer Security) in its WAP Device stack,  version 2.0 security is improved
over version 1.x.  In particular the WAP proxy no longer has to translate the WTLS protocol into the TLS protocol when sending
data to a wired web server and visa versa.  Overall WAP 2.0 provides better end-to-end security.
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